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GOING FOR THE "GOLD": AN APPLICATION OF THE OECD
BRIBERY CONVENTION TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES SCANDAL
INTRODUCTION
The Olympic movement is the epitome of the international ideal. The
Olympic games symbolize the unity of nations through fair competition and
promote world peace through an extraordinary channel founded on mutual
understanding, friendship, solidarity and sportsmanship.' The distinctiveness
attached to the Olympic games makes it one of the most noticeable and no-
ble events in the world.' The Olympic games are an inspiration for the
young, the old, the rich and the poor. With pride, anticipation, inspiration
and hope, every two years, millions of people around the world watched
Olympic athletes compete for the gold. Then, in December of 1998, the un-
expected storm hit the "Holy" arena of the Olympic games. The world was
stunned, as the Salt Lake City Bribery Scandal was unmasked.' Within days,
the Olympic image was tarnished by impropriety and scarred by corruption.'
In 1998, the Salt Lake City Bid Committee bribed International Olym-
pic Committee members ("IOC members") in an effort to win the bid for the
2002 Olympic games.' The Salt Lake City Bid Committee spent over 1.2
million dollars in gifts, entertainment and services on IOC members in an
effort to obtain their votes for Salt Lake City during the 2002 site selection
process." Eventually, Salt Lake's multimillion-dollar vote-buying scheme
secured its quest for the 2002 winter games.7 Nevertheless, the discovery of
this unethical conduct has placed the purity of the Olympic movement, as
the international ideal, in jeopardy.
1. OLYMPIC CHARTER, princ. 6, available at http://www.olympic.orglioc/e/factslcharter
/charter_into_e.html (last visited Sept 5, 2000).
2. Ronald T. Rowan, AALS Sports Law Conference: Legal Issues and the Olympic
Movement, 3 VaL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 395, 395 (1996).
3. CNN, Bribery Scandal Dulls Olympics' Century-Old Shine, at
http://europe.cnn.com/specials/1999/olympics.probe/overview (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
4. Joseph White, Congressmen Question Olympics Chief-Skeptical Panel Hears
Samaranch Maintain New Reform Measures Will Curb Corruption, STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 16,
1999, available at 1999 WL 30918352.
5. CNN, Arraignments Set Stage for Olympic Bribery Trial, at
http:lwww.cnn.com/200/law/O8/07/olympics.advance (last visited Aug. 7, 2000).
6. Larry Siddons, Clinton Urged to Help Cleanse Tarnished IOC, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, Mar. 4, 1999, at 1C.
7. 500 Days and Counting Until Summer Olympics the Bribery Scandal from the Salt
Lake City Winter Games is Still Overshadowing Sydney's Efforts to Get Ready, ORLANDO
SENTIEL, May 4, 1999, at C2.
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Unfortunately, corruption has become commonplace in today's interna-
tional arena.' When it comes to international dealings, it is not the competi-
tor with the best quality and price that will win the bid, but rather he who
offers the biggest bribe.9 Such an understanding in the sphere of interna-
tional transactions results in dire consequences that give rise to a need for
change.
In an effort to curb dishonest practices in the international arena, the
United States sought the implementation of an international agreement that
criminally punishes corrupt acts.'" In 1999, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Brib-
ery Convention") went into effect."
This Comment examines the scope of the OECD Bribery Convention
through an application of the treaty's terms to the Olympic Games Bribery
Scandal. Part I provides an overview of the Olympic Bribery Scandal. This
section briefly discusses the economic advantages of being a host city. It
also provides an overview of the Olympic Games site selection process and
describes why this process gives rise to corrupt acts such as the Olympic
Games Bribery Scandal. Part II introduces the OECD Bribery Convention,
its history and its current status. Part III examines the Olympic Bribery
Scandal in light of the OECD Convention. This part explains that, although
the OECD Bribery Convention is applicable to the Olympics, there are un-
resolved issues that call into question the scope of this Convention. Part IV
examines the implementation process of the Convention and further dis-
cusses how broadening the scope of the Convention will effect its imple-
mentation. Part V concludes with a summary of the application of the
OECD Bribery Convention to the Olympic Bribery Scandal.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES SCANDAL
A. Advantages of Being a Host City
Winning the bid to host the most popular sports event in the world
makes the Olympic Games a serious matter for many cities around the
8. Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 1075 PLI/Corp 179, 181
(1998).
9. Department of State United States of America, Fighting Global Corruption: Business
Risk Management: Information for Global Businesses and Organizations on Navigating the
International Anticorruption Environment, at http://www.state.gov/wwwglobal/narcoticslaw/
global-corruption.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
10. Peter Eigen, The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, 45 FED. LAW. 22, 22 (Aug. 1998).
11. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for
Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. Bus.
L.J. 485, 485 (2000). See infra note 45,
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world. An opportunity to host the Olympic Games provide a city with sig-
nificant economic benefits. Hundreds of thousands of people from around
the world attend the Olympic games." Typically, these are financially se-
cure people who can afford to purchase tickets that range from $70 to $900
a seat, stay in luxury hotels, dine at expensive restaurants, and return home
with numerous souvenirs. 3 In other words, the Olympic Games regularly
attract a significant number of people who have the ability to spend an ex-
cessive amount of money."' Currently, with less than two years until the
2002 winter Olympics, restaurants in Salt Lake are already making signifi-
cant profits from visitors who are preparing the city for the Olympics. 5 In
fact, with all the construction in preparation for the February 2002 games,
personal income in Utah is expected to rise significantly. 6 The economic
benefits that come with hosting the Olympic games creates stiff interna-
tional competition among cities around the world every time the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee seeks a host for an upcoming Olympic Game.
B. The Site Selection Process
Selection of a host city for the Olympic games is a "complicated proc-
ess."' 7 Generally, all cities interested in hosting a particular Olympic Game
submit a bid to the International Olympic Committee ("IOC"). The IOC
conducts research on each bidding city to determine which city can provide
the best accommodations for the games.' 8 Selection of a host city is one of
the IOC's most important decisions and therefore their study of each bid-
ding city is very detailed.'9 The IOC uses a number of factors to examine
prospective host cities."0 Once the bids are submitted to the IOC, every bid
city is sent a questionnaire, which must be filled out and returned to the
12. See Bill Sullivan, What's Up Down Under, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 19, 1999, avail-
able at 1999 WL 24254468.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Ron Ruggless, Salt Lake City in Peak form for Olympics Despite Bribery Scandal,
NATION's RESTAURANT NEws, March 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10372467. The Utah
Restaurant Association say they expect a 6.3% increase in sales for restaurants throughout the
state. Id. Currently, the average restaurant sales nation wide is only 4.6%. Id.
16. Id. The Olympics encourage restaurants and other companies to open busi-
nesses/branches in Olympic cities. See id. For example, the Los Angeles based Grill Concepts,
which operates in California and the District of Columbia opened an 8,000 square foot Grill in
Downtown Salt Lake City in preparation for the 2002 Winter Olympic games. Id. In fact, sev-
eral new restaurants and business establishments have opened in Salt Lake. Id.
17. Rowan, supra note 2, at 402.
18. Paul Mastrocola, The Lords of the Rings: The Role of Olympic Site Selection as a
Weapon Against Human Rights Abuses: China's Bid for the 2000 Olympics, 15 B.C. THIRD
WoRLDL.J. 141, 145 (1995).
19. Id. at 145.
20. Id.
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IOC. The questionnaire is comprised of fifty-two questions regarding "re-
spect for IOC rules, general and cultural information, organizational mat-
ters, and electronic media issues."22 Most cities are eliminated by their re-
sponses to the questionnaire. 3 The remaining cities are asked more detailed
questions and then the IOC conducts "fact-finding missions."'"
During this "fact-finding mission" of investigation the IOC evaluates
the city's ability to provide adequate security and tourist accommodations.'
Furthermore, the IOC considers the city and the state's political involve-
ment.26 Following these investigations, the IOC prepares a report on the fi-
nal candidate cities.2 ' The report "evaluates each city on twenty-three
themes, ranging from meteorological conditions to sports experiences."
After reviewing the reports, the IOC members cast their vote for the Host
City. Unfortunately, this selection process travels through an intense chain
of commands, which leads to unfair, unethical and biased decisions.
C. Olympic Scandals
1. Salt Lake City Scandal
In 1998, Salt Lake City won the bid for the 2002 winter games.' The
Salt Lake City Bidding committee spent over a million dollars in an effort to
buy votes that would make them the Host City for the 2002 Olympic
Games." The Bidding Committee bribed the IOC members and their fami-
lies with a variety of lavish gifts.32 These gifts included shopping sprees and
scholarships for children of IOC members.33 Furthermore, when certain IOC
members arrived in Salt Lake to evaluate the city during their "fact-finding
mission," the Committee spent thousands of dollars worth of hospitality on
the IOC representatives and their families. ' In fact, Australian IOC member
Phil Coles was asked to resign after it was revealed that he accepted
$60,000 worth of entertainment from Salt Lake City Officials during the bid
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Erskine McCullough, Upbear Gooper Defends Himself Against Corruption Allega-
tions, AGENCY FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 6, 2000, at A2.
31. USOC Used Bribes to Get 2002 Olympics, WASH. TRMEs, Nov. 14, 1999, at A13.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Cole Now Faces Jewel Bribe Claim: Olympics, GUARDIAN, Mar. 20, 1999, avail-
able at 1999 WL 14124702.
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for the winter 2002 Olympics.35 The Bidding Committee the IOC members
with everything from cash to shopping sprees to free medical services in an
effort to win votes for Salt Lake City.36
2. 1996 Summer Olympics
Unfortunately, the Salt Lake City Scandal was not an isolated incident.
Since the Salt Lake Scandal, evidence of corruption in the bid for the 1996
Summer Games has also been exposed.37 In fact, many contend that a "cul-
ture of corruption" surrounded the bids for the 1996 Olympic Games.38 In an
unsuccessful effort to win the bid for the 1996 games, it has been revealed
that representatives from Athens, Greece gave the Australian IOC represen-
tative's wife gold and diamonds.39 Furthermore, in Toronto, Mayor Mel
Lastman is questioning Paul Henderson, the former head of Toronto's Bid
Committee, regarding expenses used to solicit the 1996 bid.' The Toronto
Bid Committee apparently gave $150,000 worth of Swiss watches to IOC
members, spent $12,500 on airfare for IOC member Jean-Claude Ganga of
the Republic of Congo, and expended $2,880 to charter a plane for IOC
President, Jean-Antonio Samaranch.4
Furthermore, in 1990 when the IOC members accepted bids for the
1996 Summer Games, the Atlanta Bid Committee offered Mr. Samaranch's
wife an "all-expenses-paid $12,000 trip to [Atlanta] Georgia. ', 2 She ac-
cepted the offer and shortly thereafter, "Atlanta was awarded the 1996
Summer Games."' 3 Investigative hearings revealed that corruption has been
a "long standing practice" in the international search and subsequent selec-
tion of Olympic Host Cities."M The question now becomes whether the
35. See Mike Gorrell, U.S. Legislators Are Making Moves to Force Changes in the IOC
Alaskan Senator is Pushing Legislation that Would Coerce International Body to Install a
Check-and-Balance System, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 4, 1999, at A6.
36. CNN, Olympic Bidders Delaying Bribery Trial, Dec. 29, 1998, available at
http://www.cnn.con/US/98i22/29/olympic.bribery.ol/index.html. Medical services, including
plastic surgery, were provided to IOC members. Id.
37. David Pace, Upton Calls for Olympics Cleanup Congressional Probe to Look at
Committee's "Culture of Corruption," SouTH BEND TRMUNE, Sept. 22, 1999, at Al.
38. Id.
39. Cole Now Faces Jewel Bribe Claim, supra note 34.
40. Gorrell, supra note 35, at A6.
41. Id.
42. White, supra note 4.
43. id.
44. Panel to Look for Corruption at Olympics; Congressional Hearings to Probe Atlanta
Bidding, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 22, 1999, at A9, available at 1999 WL 5204554. Further-
more, there is talk of corruption throughout the Olympic process. For example, Japanese di-
rectors in-charge of selecting competitors for the Japanese national equestrian team are being
investigated for allegedly receiving over 3.65 million yen ($30,420) dollars) from former
Olympic rider Yoshinaga Sakurai. Japanese Olympics Equestrian Team Hit by Corruption
Scandal, AGENCY FRANCE-PRESSE, July 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2632815. Sakurai was
allegedly did not qualify for the national team but after Sakurai paid the officials he was se-
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OECD Bribery Convention applies to this particular type of international
corruption.
II. THE OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION
The OECD Bribery Convention, formally known as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development's Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business, went into ef-
fect on February 15, 1999.' 5 The OECD Bribery Convention marks a sea of
change in the fight against international corruption.' The Convention is an
agreement between thirty-four member countries to fight corruption in in-
ternational business transactions.4 The convention requires the member
countries to enact laws that will impose criminal penalties on domestic cor-
porations who offer bribes to foreign officials in an effort to gain an unfair
business advantage. 8 The convention is considered a "landmark achieve-
ment" and is expected to curb corrupt international practices."
The OECD Bribery Convention is composed of seventeen articles.'
Under Article 1, entitled "The Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cial," states that it is a criminal offense "for any person intentionally to of-
fer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage.., in order to
obtain or retain business or any other improper advantage in the conduct of
lected to represent Japan in the 1996 Olympic games. Id. It has also been revealed that another
rider's parents paid 800,000 yen to a high ranked official who nominated their son for the
1996 Olympic team. Id.
45. OECD online, OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, (last visited Sept. 8, 2000), at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/. See also Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development: Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
46. George, supra note 11, at 485.
47. OECD Convention, supra note 45. These countries include Iceland, Japan, Germany,
Hungary, USA, Finland, the UK, Canada, Norway, Bulgaria, Korea, Greece, Austria, Mexico,
Sweden, Belgium, the Slovak Republic Australia, Spain, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Tur-
key, and France. Id.
48. Judd Lawler, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't? The OECD Convention and
the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1249, 1249 (1999).
49. See Eigen, supra note 10, at 22. It must be noted that use of bribery to obtain an ad-
vantage is a form of bargaining with roots reaching back to the beginning of time. This type of
quid pro quo not only fosters low moral and ethical standards, it has devastating consequences
on international transactions. See Conference, The Experts Round Table: A Hemispheric Ap-
proach to Combating Corruption, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 759, 763-64 (2000). Corruption
through bribery leads to unfairness, dishonesty and the eventual dissolution of international
relationships. See id. The pervasiveness of bribery has particularly had a negative impact on
the international business community. See id. Particularly, corruption drives prices up, hinders
foreign investment and stifles economic growth. See id. Furthermore, those who practice in-
ternational business in a fair manner and seek to obtain contracts through the quality and price
of their product and service they provide are, in a sense, penalized when they must compete
with others who utilize corrupt practices. See id.
50. OECD Convention, supra note 45.
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international business."'" Article 1 defines the offense of bribery punished
by this act and thus contains the rule for the OECD Convention.52 This paper
will therefore focus primarily be on Article 1. Nonetheless, the remaining
sixteen articles should be mentioned briefly so that a clear understanding of
the OECD Bribery Convention may be attained.
Article 2, entitled "Responsibility of Legal Persons," states that each
party has the freedom to "establish the liability of legal persons" who bribe
foreign public officials in violation of the Convention.53 Article 3, entitled
"Sanctions," generally states that "effective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties" shall be imposed on those who bribe foreign public offi-
cials.54 Countries that do not have criminal corporate liability established as
part of their legal system must provide equivalent non-criminal punishment,
such as monetary sanctions for corporate offenders." Furthermore, Article 3
permits the seizure or confiscation of proceeds of the bribe of a foreign pub-
lic official.56
Article 4 discusses jurisdiction. Under Article 4, a party to the Conven-
tion has jurisdiction over an alleged violation of the OECD Convention
when the offense of bribery is committed within the territory of the member
nation.' When more than one party to the Convention has jurisdiction over
an alleged violation of the Convention, then the two countries must consult
with each other and determine which forum will be most appropriate for
prosecution.5 Prior to declaring jurisdiction over an alleged violation within
the scope of the Convention the prosecuting country must be able to show
that jurisdiction is "effective in the fight against the bribery of Foreign Pub-
lic Officials."'59 Articles 5-8 discuss enforcement, statute of limitations,
money laundering and accounting respectively.' These Articles are ex-
tremely broad because the Convention heavily relies on the sovereignty of
the individual signatory nations to control these aspects of the Convention.
Article 9, entitled "Mutual Legal Assistance," requires the parties to
provide one another with prompt and effective assistance.6' Under Article
10, the OECD mandates that bribery of a foreign public official is an extra-
ditable offense.62 Nevertheless, in the spirit of state sovereignty the Conven-
51. Id. art. 1.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 2.
54. Id. art. 3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 4. This jurisdictional rule does not require the offense to be entirely committed
within the nation seeking jurisdiction. Id. Even when the offense was partly committed in a
member nation's territory then that nation obtains jurisdiction of the matter. Id.
58. ld.
59. Id.
60. Id. arts. 5-8.
61. Id. art. 9.
62. Id art. 10.
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tion states that extradition is "subject to the conditions set out in the domes-
tic law, applicable treaties and arrangements of each Party."'63 Article 11
merely states when the Secretary-General of the OECD must be notified of
an alleged violation of the Convention." It also determines when the secre-
tary-general may need to serve as a liaison between the two parties.' Article
12 states that the parties shall monitor and promote full implementation of
the Convention.' The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions is specifically responsible for monitoring the imple-
mentatior, of the Convention.67 Article 13 lays out the options for signature
and induction to the Convention.6
Articles 14 and 15 set forth the ratification and other requirements for
becoming a signatory to the OECD Bribery Convention.' Acceptance, ap-
proval or ratification of the Convention must be in accordance with the re-
spective laws of the Signatory nations."0 The formal requirement for entry
into force is the ratification by five of the ten countries that have the largest
export shares among the OECD countries and represent at least sixty percent
of the combined total exports of those countries."
Article 16 states that any party may propose an amendment to the Con-
vention." The proposal is communicated to the other parties who have at
least sixty days to review the proposal.73 A meeting is held with all the Sig-
natories to consider the proposed amendment.74 If the proposed amendment
is adopted by a consensus, the amendment is entered "into force sixty days
after the deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval by
all of the Parties."" Finally, Article 17 describes the withdrawal process
from the Convention.76 To withdraw, a party must submit written notifica-
tion to the depository.77 One year after the notice of withdrawal is received
the party is effectively withdrawn from the Convention.7
Although the OECD Bribery Convention is broadly drafted, the basis of
the Convention is that signatory countries agree to enact laws to criminally
punish bribery of foreign officials in an effort to gain an improper advantage
63. Id.
64. Id. art. I I.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 12.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 13.
69. Id. arts. 14 & 15.
70. Id. art. 14.
71. Id. art. 15.
72. Id. art. 16.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Idl
76. Id. art. 17.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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in international business transactions;"' therefore, the scope and application
of the OECD Convention primarily lies with the interpretation of Article 1.
Article 1 of the OECD Bribery Convention is comprised of three main
elements. the first element is that a bribe was offered. The OECD Conven-
tion punishes active bribery, which means it applies to any person who of-
fers the bribe as opposed to those who accept the bribe (passive bribery)."'
Second, the bribe must be offered to a foreign public official. 2 Third, the
bribe must be made during or in connection with an international business
transaction.83 The question now becomes how far do the terms of this
agreement reach? More specifically, is the scope of the OECD Bribery
Convention, as it stands, sufficient to combat the type of corruption that tar-
nished the image of the Olympic Games?
III. THE OECD CONVENTION AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES SCANDAL
A detailed analysis of all three elements is necessary to determine the
definition and scope of this international Convention and its impact on the
type of international corruption found in the Olympic Games Scandal.
A. Offer
Article 1 specifically states that it is a criminal offense for any person
to intentionally bribe a foreign public official.84 In the instant matter, Salt
Lake representatives bribed IOC members when they gave them money,
gifts, free medical procedures, and provided them with lavish entertain-
ment." Such evidence satisfies the requirement of the first element and ap-
plies to those particular individuals who offered the bribes to IOC mem-
bers."' A subsequent question, however, is whether the bid committee,
whose primary function is within the United States, can be penalized under
the given Convention?
79. See generally OECD Convention, supra note 45.
80. Id art. 1.
81. Lisa Miller, No More This for That? The Effect of the OECD Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 8 CARDOZO J.
INT'L& CoMP. L. 139, 141 (2000).
82. OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bribery Scandal Dulls Olympics' Century Old Shine, supra note 3.
86. Clearly two individuals who would be prosecuted under the OECD would include
Tom Welch, President of the Salt Lake bid Committee, and Dave Johnson, Vice President. See
Olympic Bidders Delaying Bribery Trial (last visited Sept. 9, 2000), at
http://www.canoe.ca/slamOOO919/oly_delay-.ap.html. Both men face a 15 count felony
indictment and went to trial on Oct. 16 for allegedly masterminding the salt lake Olympic
bribery scandal. Id. The federal indictments accuse them of conspiring to bribe IOC members
who awarded the Salt Lake the 2002 Winter Games. Id.
9
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As mentioned in Article 2 of the Convention, responsibility of legal en-
tities is imposed under the OECD Convention if the signatory country,
where the bribe was offered, imposes or seeks to impose criminal liability
for entities that bribe foreign public officials." First, the Salt Lake Bid
Committee is a legal entity according to U.S. law because the committee
was formally established, in 1988, as a non-profit organization which, as
noted before, falls within the meaning of a legal entity as required for
OECD purposes.8 Additionally, the United States does recognize legal li-
ability for such organizations involved in bribery of a foreign public offi-
cial."
The United States has a long-standing practice of holding legal entities
liable for corrupt acts." In 1977, the United States passed the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act ("FCPA").9" Under FCPA, it is illegal for any person in
the United States to bribe foreign government officials in an effort to obtain
business or any other unfair advantage.' The Act states, "it's a federal crime
for any U.S. person or entity to offer or to pay either directly or through an
intermediary, anything of value to a foreign government official in order to
gain an improper commercial advantage in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness.
'9 3
87. OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 2.
88. See Articles of Incorporation, Salt Lake City Bid Committee for the Olympic Winter
Games, available at http://www.state.ut.us/serv/bes?id=1670073$action=details (last
visited May 19, 2001). Note that after Utah was awarded the 2002 Winter games the bid
committee formally changed the corporation's name to the Salt Lake Organizing Committee
for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002. See id.
89. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-l&2, 78ff (1994).
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and Fair Competition: July 2000,
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION, ch. 9
(2000), available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/antib/oecd2000/index.html. [hereinafter
SEcoND ANNUAL REPORT] FCPA was implemented as a result of the 1970's uproar regarding
numerous incidents of bribery by U.S. companies. Id. In an effort to repair the bad reputation
of US businesses, congress enacted the FCPA. Id.
93. Id. Nonetheless, as a result of the FCPA, U.S. businesses were forced to compete in
the world market with only the "strength and quality of their goods and services." Id Al-
though the quality American made products are attractive to consumers, American businesses
suffer a tremendous disadvantage in international market competition. Id. American busi-
nesses often lost out on contracts because they were forced to compete with foreign businesses
that suffered no repercussion for bribing foreign officials in order to secure conferments. Id. In
fact, in some countries bribes were deemed legitimate tax deductions. Id. This is particularly
beneficial for such nations because bribes were often times valued up to 30% of what the con-
tract was worth. Id. In fact the Congressional report estimates that billions of dollars in inter-
national contracts around the world have been influenced by bribes. Id. It is estimated that
from May 1994 to April 2000, 353 contracts worth $165 million billion dollars were possibly
affected by bribes from foreign businesses. Id. "US firms are believed to have lost 92 of these
contracts, worth approximately $26 billion, to foreign competitors offering bribes." id. In
other instances, US firms were forced to withdraw from competition over a contract "because
the foreign officials demanded bribes." Id. (emphasis added).
10
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As a legal entity, the bid committee satisfies the required element of of-
fer. The fact that the Bid Committee is a non-profit organization should not
bar the application of the Convention. Non-profit organizations should not
be exempt from punishments imposed by the OECD Bribery Convention
because non-profit organizations can violate the OECD Convention through
its association with other entities." Bid committees, for example, have ex-
tensive relations with other public and private entities and such associations
are sufficient to violate the OECD Bribery Convention.95 The Salt Lake Bid-
ding Committee was not only supported by the city, but also backed by the
broader business community.96 Large entities such as Coca-Cola supported
the Salt Lake Bid Committee. Allowing the bid committee to use its non-
profit status as a tool for exemption would open the door for other entities to
further such corrupt practices under the umbrella of non-profit status.98
B. Foreign Public Official
The second element of Article 1 of the OECD Bribery Convention re-
quires that a corporation make a bribe to a foreign public official.9 In this
section it is necessary to determine whether the IOC members are consid-
ered foreign public officials. The Convention defines a foreign public offi-
cial as "any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of
a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or pub-
lic enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organiza-
tion.'""W This is a broad definition of foreign public official.' The framers of
the Convention created such a non-conclusive definition of foreign public
official because they intended to allow for a broad interpretation of this
Convention."2
As the treaty stands now, the IOC members would not fall within the
definition of foreign public official as required to satisfy the prerequisite of
the second element of the OECD Bribery Convention. First, IOC members
do not hold a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign coun-
94. Rowan, supra note 2, at 404.
95. See id.
96. See generally Rowan, supra note 2.
97. See id. at 405.
98. See generally SEcoND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 9.
99. OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an International Enforce-
ment Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 53,
69 (1999).
102. Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corrup-
tion and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD
Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM.
U. INT'L L. REv. 257, 313 (1998).
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try as part of their service on the International Olympic Committee. 3 Sec-
ond, IOC members do not exercise a public function for a foreign country
nor are they part of a public agency or public enterprise."6 The only alterna-
tive to satisfy the requirement of this element and apply it to IOC members,
therefore, is to pull the IOC members into the limited definition of officials
or agents of a public international organization."5
Whether or not the IOC members are agents of a public international
organization will depend on whether the IOC is itself a public international
organization. Determining the classification of the IOC can be achieved
through a systematic analysis of the terms: public, international and organi-
zation. 6
Without any dispute the IOC is an international organization and fits
the "international" aspect of public international organization. 7 By defini-
tion international includes the involvement of two or more nations or na-
tionalities.' The IOC is comprised of ninety-three individuals from differ-
ent nations." Additionally, IOC members make decisions that affect various
countries and deal extensively with athletes and other persons around the
globe."' Furthermore, although the IOC was originally established in Swit-
zerland, its business practices and dealings reach a wide range of host coun-
tries throughout the world."' The IOC, therefore, plausibly falls within the
meaning of the term international as provided by the OECD's section defin-
ing the elements of foreign public official.
Based on the foregoing, it is fair to assume that the IOC could be con-
sidered an "organization" within the meaning of foreign public official. By
definition an organization is comprised of a group of people who have spe-
cific responsibilities for a united purpose or work."' The IOC satisfies this
definition. The IOC is a group of people with the united duty of organizing
and running the Olympic Games."' The IOC is an "entity which owns the
rights to the Olympic Games."" 4 They have the sole authority and control
over major aspects of the Olympic Games, such as the selection of the host
cities."5 Because the IOC consists of a group of people from various nations
103. DAVIDA KRIsTY, COBERTIN'S OLYMPIcs How THE GAMES BEGAN 54 (Lerner Publi-
cations Co. 1995).
104. See id.
105. See OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1.
106. See Id.
107. See id.
108. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1181 (7" ed. 1971).
109. See Mastrocola, supra note 18, at 143-44.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 108, at 1591.
113. KRISTY, supra note 103, at 54.
114. Mastrocola, supra note 18, at 145.
115. Id. at 145.
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united for a common purpose, without doubt, it can be considered an inter-
national organization." 6
Whether the IOC is a public international organization, however, is a
more difficult issue. The OECD Convention itself does not provide for any
specific terms indicating what constitutes a public international organiza-
tion." ' A commentary regarding the Convention, however, adopted by the
negotiating conference in November of 1997, provides that a public interna-
tional organization "includes any international organization formed by
states, governments, or other public international organizations.""' The IOC
holds itself out as a nonprofit organization because when Baron Pierre De
Coubertin established the IOC he classified it as a private non-governmental
organization."" Mr. De Coubertin intentionally designated the IOC as a pri-
vate non-governmental organization to eliminate any possible governmental
intervention or the Olympic Games. 2"
Arguably an organization is public if it represents a community or
group of people.' Thus, in the present case, the question is whether the
ninety-three multinational IOC members, who comprise of the IOC Com-
mittee constitute a public international organization. If the IOC members
represent their individual nations can they be considered a Public Interna-
tional Organization? In an effort to avoid this classification of an IOC mem-
ber "[tjhe IOC does not consider its individual members representatives of
their nation-states ... [but instead] [t]hey are [considered] 'ambassadors of
the Olympic ideal' to their homelands."'2 It is unlikely, therefore, that the
IOC can be deemed a public international organization.
In its annual report to Congress, the Department of Commerce dis-
cussed the need and desire to broaden the scope of the OECD Convention.'
The report specifically stated that the Convention should extend the mean-
ing of a foreign public official."24 The proposal is to include "foreign politi-
cal parties, party officials, and candidates for public office" within the
meaning of foreign public official. 5 The new trend in broadening the
aforementioned definition of foreign public official does not, however, shed
any light on the vagueness of the current language of the Convention.'26 Ef-
116. See id. at 143.
117. See generally OECD Convention, supra note 45.
118. Lewis, supra note 8, at 184.
119. See KRISTY, supra note 103, at 54. The 1OC was established by the French educator
Pierre De Coubertin on June 23, 1894. See generally id.
120. Id.
121. WEBSTER's THID NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 108, at 1836.
122. Mastrocola, supra note 18, at 144.
123. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 9.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1.
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forts to broaden the scope of the Convention, therefore, must be seen as a
critical tool in the fight against corruption."'
A major deficiency of the OECD Bribery Convention is that it only
punishes "active bribery."'2 Active bribery includes offenses committed by
the person who makes the promise or gives the bribe. 29 The Convention
does not punish the "passive briber," which is a person who receives the
bribe. 3 The problem with only punishing active bribery and not passive
bribery is that when it comes to international corruption it is often those on
the receiving end who demand the bribes. For example, during the site se-
lection for the 1996 Olympic Summer Games, IOC members demanded
gifts and favors from the Atlanta Bid Committee.'' Solicitations of bribes
and private sector corruption is largely undefined and unexplored but is
nonetheless becoming hot issues in the fight against international corruption
through the OECD.'
A new revolutionary tool against international corruption includes
broadening the scope of the OECD Convention to include penalization of
those who seek bribes in the course of an international business transac-
tions.'33 An effective international corruption treaty is counterproductive if it
punishes one party while relieving the other for the commission of the same
corrupt act. 3 Private international organizations are involved in interna-
tional business transactions and unless they are included in the treaty, the
Convention cannot truly fight corruption. 33 The OECD has an important
purpose and it is headed in the right direction, however, the Convention
needs to be strengthened and its authorities must become more binding upon
signatory nations of the Convention.36
C. International Business Transaction
The third element of Article 1 of the OECD Convention prohibits ob-
taining business or any other improper advantage through the use of bribery
in the course of an international business transaction.'37 A business transac-
tion, by definition, is an agreement between two or more entities for the
127. Rubin, supra note 102, at 313.
128. Lisa Miller, No More "This for That"? The Effect of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 8
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMe. L. 139, 141 (2000).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Pace, supra note 37, at Al.
132. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 6.
133. George, supra note 11, at 486.
134. See generally id
135. See generally id.
136. See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 6.
137. OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. The Convention states "other improper
advantage" which refers to something a company was not clearly entitled to. See id.
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purchase or exchange of goods, services, rights or other business relations. 3 '
In the international arena, such agreements are governed and defined by in-
ternational agreements such as the United Nations Convention on Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("ICSG").39 ICSG applies to transactions involving
sale of goods between or among contracting entities whose place of busi-
nesses are in different states.'" Business people around the world negotiate
international business agreements almost every day. These business transac-
tions include a wide variety of areas such as the purchasing and selling of
products in foreign nations, opening franchises and obtaining licensing
agreements for particular privileges and rights. 4' The question here, how-
ever, is whether the interactions between the IOC and bid committees are
within the scope of what constitutes an international business transaction.
The business relationship between the a IOC and the bid committee is
fairly straightforward. Once the bid committee sends their bid to the IOC,
the IOC must investigate the candidate cities to determine its final selec-
tions."2 As part of their investigation, the IOC negotiates with the bid com-
mittee and visits the potential host cities to inspect the bidding city's facili-
ties."3 The two foreign entities interact in an effort to reach an agreement on
a number of issues surrounding the Olympic games. Eventually, the IOC
grants the Host City the permission to host the Olympic Games and the City
agrees to provide the facilities for the Olympic events.'" The IOC and the
bid committees are two foreign entities involved in business negotiations
that may be seen as an international business transaction, within the mean-
ing of the OECD Bribery Convention.
By using bribery to win the bid as the Host of the Olympic Games, bid
committees violate the general spirit of the OECD Convention. The Olym-
pic Games bring in millions of tourism dollars and provide a plethora of
other benefits for a Host City. Thus, the stiff competition that exists among
host city candidates is quite intense. As noted before, IOC members or their
families are showered with cash, gifts, costly entertainment, shopping sprees
and more when they visit these potential host cities." Host cities provide
138. BARRON'S LEGAL GUIDE LEGAL DICTIONARY 496 (3d ed. 1991).
139. See generally United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (1980) (text appears in Annex I of the Final Act of the 1980 Vienna Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 97/19 (1980)).
140. Id. art. 1.
141. See id.
142. Stephen Wilson, Olympics Ban Free Trips to Bid Cities the International Olympic
Committee Votes for Reforms on the One-Year Anniversary of Bribery Charges, GREENSBORO
NEws & RECORD, Dec. 13, 1999, at Al.
143. Id. (the rules have changed and IOC members are not to visit bidding cities).
144. It is similar to the international licensing agreement seen in the Wood v. Lucy, 118
N.E. 214 (1917) (Lady Duff-Gordon case) where defendant a clothing designer gave plaintiff,
a foreign businessman, the exclusive right to sell her line of clothing in his store. Likewise, the
IOC gives a particular city the right to host the Olympic games. Both are deemed international
agreements.
145. USOC Used Bribes to Get 2002 Olympics, supra note 31, at A13.
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these luxuries for the sole purpose of gaining an advantage in Olympic
Games site selection bargaining process. The bid committees' behavior can
be considered a form of bribery in the international business arena, because
it is an act that is in full contrast to the rules and regulations set forth for
such an entity by the general spirit of the OECD Bribery Convention." This
is a form of international corruption which blocks fair competition---exactly
what the spirit of the OECD Bribery Convention treaty aims to prevent.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. The Implementation and Enforcement of International Conventions
The adoption of an international anti-corruption treaty, such as the
OECD Bribery Convention, is merely the first step in combating interna-
tional corruption. The real challenge in truly fighting international corrup-
tion lies in the ratification, effective implementation and enforcement of the
international agreement.47 Libraries around the world shelve numerous in-
ternational conventions that were adopted but never effectively imple-
mented."8 In fact, international conventions are often referred to as "nothing
more than paper promises.'' 49
International conventions are difficult to enforce because there is no
centralized oversight system to specifically enforce such international
agreements." Basically, international treaties are agreements between dif-
ferent nations that become signatories to a given Convention.'5 ' Conventions
are primarily agreements carried out in good faith by the respective signa-
tory nations. Nonetheless, often relations between signatory countries
breakdown, which hinders or in some instances obstructs enforcement of the
Convention. Regardless of the difficulties associated with effective imple-
mentation and enforcement of international treaties, history shows that con-
ventions can be effectively implemented. The key is that the signatory coun-
tries must be more inclined to adopt and actually enforce the terms of the
particular Convention in which they become a member.'
146. See OECD Convention, supra note 45, art. 1.
147. Conference, supra note 49, at 788.
148. See id. at 794.
149. See id. at 790.
150. See id. Often times various agencies and ministries within a signatory nation are
given the responsibility of enforcing conventions. See id. With so many different agencies in-
volved the success rate for the implementation of conventions has been disappointing. Id.
Since the OECD Convention, there have been discussions about the creation of international
courts of corruption. Lawler, supra note 48, at 1322.
151. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1507 (7b ed. 1999).
152. See Conference, supra note 49, at 810.
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B. A More Specific Approach Toward Implementation & Enforcement of the
OECD Bribery Convention
A number of conventions have been successfully adopted, ratified, im-
plemented and enforced. The key to effective implementation and enforce-
ment is monitoring.' The Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") is a prime
example of an effectively monitored convention." Fortunately, the OECD
Convention's enforcement provisions have been modeled after the
FAFT's.155 In order to become a signatory of the OECD Convention, a na-
tion is required to participate in the OECD monitoring process."6 The moni-
toring system adopted by the OECD Convention, like the FAFT, is referred
to as "Mutual Evaluation."'' Mutual Evaluation is comprised of four main
goals that all signatories agree to strive to achieve. These goals are: "(1) to
increase knowledge among signatories, (2) to promote progress and consis-
tency, (3) to identify and address problems with compliance, and (4) to
build momentum for corrective action." 158
With mutual respect and compliance between the signatory nations, at-
tainment of the four aforementioned goals would allow for progress in the
fight against corruption. "5 Nonetheless, implementation of the OECD
among the different signatory countries varies. Each country's legal frame-
work is unique, which makes a perfectly uniform implementation procedure
virtually impossible."w While some countries have existing legislation to
combat corruption, others do not.' In accordance with the OECD Conven-
tion, those countries that do not impose criminal liability on such corruption
must alter their legal system to adapt to the language of the Convention,
which requires the imposition of criminal punishment on such proven cor-
ruption.62
Since its adoption, OECD signatory members have taken implementa-
tion of the OECD very seriously. So far, representatives from all the signa-
tory countries have regular meetings to review and discuss the implementa-
tion of the Convention.6 Each country is required to prepare progress
reports regarding implementation, which are discussed in the meetings.'
Furthermore, a team of experts of various backgrounds gathers in each na-
153. Id. at 793.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 793-800.
160. See generally Lawler, supra note 48.
161. Id. Japan is an example of a country that does not impose criminal sanctions on cor-
rupt business practices. Id.
162. See id. at 1307.
163. Conference, supra note 49, at 797.
164. Id.
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tion to evaluate the signatory's progress with regard to the Convention." In
addition, a formal report on each country's enforcement status is prepared
and distributed to the other signatories for comparison.'"
Although many signatory countries have taken strong enforcement
measures, evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement measures at this time
is premature. The OECD is still relatively new.'" Nonetheless, ratification
and implementation by the signatory countries is progressing quickly.'" Fur-
thermore, since the adoption of the Convention, the OECD has tenaciously
pursued further anti-corruption measures."0 Discussions of the creation of a
program to specifically monitor the Convention's implementation are under
way.'70 Discussions even exist regarding mandatory compliance programs
where each entity subject to the OECD Convention will have policies, en-
forced through training sessions to promote the endorsement and compli-
ance with anti-bribery measures.' At this point, anti bribery groups such as
Transparency International, will continue to closely monitor enforcement of
the OECD Convention around the world.
72
C. Broadening the Scope and the Impact on Implementation
The Convention's relatively solid foundation and the apparent sense of
cooperation among its members would prevent any possible negative effect
that might arise by broadening the scope of the Convention to include pri-
vate international organizations within the meaning of foreign public offi-
cials.77 For example, offering bribes to agents of a private international or-
ganization should be sufficient to trigger the OECD's extradition
coverage."74
Furthermore, by expanding the scope of the OECD Convention to in-
clude passive corruption, bribe seekers will not have a negative impact on
the implementation or effectiveness of the OECD Convention. 5 Thus, those
entities that demand bribes in the course of an international business trans-
165. Id.
166. See id. This also works as a form of peer pressure on those countries who lag behind
in implementing the Convention. See id. Failure to properly implement the convention will
result in an unfavorable report, which will be made public. Id.
167. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 3.
168. See id.
169. See Lawler, supra note 48, at 1309-10.
170. Id. at 1309.
171. See id. at 1328.
172. See Conference, supra note 49, at 790.
173. See generally id.
174. The OECD "suffices as a legal basis for extradition. If a signatory country refuses to
extradite one of its own nationals accused by another signatory of making a bribe, the refusing
signatory must submit the case to its own authorities for prosecution." Lawler, supra note 48,
at 1308.
175. See George, supra note 11, at 486.
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action should be subject to discipline under the Convention.'76 Currently, the
Convention has an effective monitoring system and therefore broadening
the scope of the Convention to include passive bribery would not pose too
much of a burden.""
V. CONCLUSION
International corruption is a multi-dimensional problem. It is a complex
issue with serious repercussions on international relations and the interna-
tional economy in general. For years the United States has struggled to deal
with this phenomenon that so negatively impacts American businesses. In
an effort to hamper corrupt practices, the United States enacted the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.78 This law however, made it more of a bur-
den on United States business to compete in international business transac-
tions."9 The FCPA made it a federal crime for anyone in the United States to
bribe a foreign public official in an effort to gain an unfair advantage. 8 The
FCPA only had jurisdiction over U.S. persons and entities so while those
businesses in the U.S. refrained from bribing, foreign businesses did not,
and in the end the U.S. businesses suffered. Something new was needed to
deal with this dilemma of international corruption.
In February of 1999, the OECD Bribery Convention was adopted.' So
far, it has been widely accepted and actively implemented throughout many
signatory countries around the world despite its short existence."' The
OECD is much broader than the FCPA and provides a promising foundation
to fight international corruption. With a few changes, the OECD Bribery
Convention has the potential to serve as the key to combat corruption in the
Olympic arena.
In applying the terms of the OECD Bribery Convention to the corrup-
tion connected with the Olympic Bribery Scandal, it is evident that the Con-
vention's scope must be clarified and broadened in order to be truly effec-
tive. The OECD Bribery Convention should include both private and public
entities. By not including private entities such as the bidding committee
within the meaning of the OECD Bribery Convention, acts of bribery in the
international arena can simply be practiced through a channel run by public,
non-profit entities. Many of these public, nonprofit entities, such as bidding
committees, are backed by large private corporations."
176. See id.
177. See Conference, supra note 49, at 795-801.
178. SEcOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, ch. 9.
179. Rubin, supra note 102, at 273.
180. Id. at 272.
181. See generally OECD Convention, supra note 45.
182. See generally Conference, supra note 49.
183. See Rowan, supra note 2, at 405.
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The scope of the Convention should also be expanded to include pas-
sive bribery. Currently, the Convention punishes active bribery, those who
offer bribes to foreign pubic officials in the course of an international busi-
ness transactions.'" The Convention does not penalize those who receive the
bribes." Nonetheless, often times corruption is induced by bribe seekers
and thus to effectively combat international corruption passive bribery must
be deterred as well.
As the OECD Convention stands, it does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over the type of international corruption seen in Olympic Bribery Scandal. 8"
Regardless, the Salt Lake Bid Committee is a legal entity that offered bribes
in the course of an international business transaction to gain an unfair ad-
vantage.' The OECD Bribery Convention is still new and improvements
must be made to extend its jurisdiction over all forms of international cor-
ruption-including the type that tarnished the sanctity of the Olympic
Games.
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